This week I finished reading Chris Whipple’s 2017 book, The Gatekeepers: How the White House Chiefs of Staff Define Every Presidency. As a presidential politics nerd, I found it fascinating, but I expect that anyone who is even somewhat interested in the inner workings of the West Wing would it find it compelling.
White House chiefs of staff in a typical presidency decide who gets to the see the president, they negotiate with Congress, and they’re often the last person in the room with the president after meetings with advisors and other members of his administration. (I use the modifier “typically,” because none of that applies to chiefs of staff in the current administration.)
Whipple conducted extensive interviews with all seventeen living chiefs and two former presidents to compile a close-up look at how the chiefs did their job and what the job was like for them. Whipple makes a compelling case that the chief of staff’s effectiveness is pivotal to the success of the president and his administration. (Please forgive the masculine pronouns; to date, not only all presidents but also all chiefs of staff have been men.) Among the insights Whipple offers is what distinguishes those have been effective in the role from those who have failed.
It was interesting to me that the most effective chiefs have been not only strong-willed, as one might expect, but also respectful and collegial. The ones that crashed and burned were those who were the most imperious and self-important, like Ronald Reagan’s second chief, Donald Regan, who was fired after he hung up on Nancy Reagan. It’s not enough, apparently, to simply be the person closest to the president, a chief of staff also needs allies — people who will give him a heads-up when trouble is brewing, and side with him in internecine conflicts among the president’s advisors. Reagan’s first chief, James Baker, III, whom many view as the best chief of staff ever, was widely regarded as a straight shooter by journalists and as a collaborator by Congressional leaders. He personally returned every phone called he received.
The book is laid out in chronological order, with one chapter devoted to each administration of the last 50 years, from Richard Nixon’s to Barack Obama’s. But in a prologue, Whipple tells a remarkable story: In December 2008, after Barack Obama was elected and chose Rahm Emmanuel as his first chief of staff, George W. Bush’s chief at the time, Josh Bolton, invited every living chief of staff to a private meeting at the White House for the purpose of giving Emmanuel advice on how to succeed in the role. All but two of the former chiefs showed up. Bolton went around the table and gave each of those present a chance to speak. Ken Duberstein, Reagan’s last chief of staff, went first.
“Always remember,” he said, looking at Emmanuel, “that when you open your mouth, it is not you but the president who is speaking.” Emanuel stared back at him. “Oh, shit!” he said. The chiefs erupted in laughter.
Another big laugh came when Dick Cheney, who had served as Gerald Ford’s chief of staff, delivered his advice: “At all costs,” he said gravely, “control your vice president.”
Sounds like another book I need to put on the list (which gets ever longer!).